information. The final key generation rate per raw key bit is given by 5 , R = 1 − H(e bit ) − H(e ph ).
When the error rates, e bit and e ph , exceeds some thresholds, the key rate becomes zero or negative and hence no secure keys can be generated.
In conventional QKD protocols, security is guaranteed by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle which guarantees that any attempts of eavesdropping the quantum channel would inevitably cause quantum signal disturbances. Therefore, the leaked information obtained by an eavesdropper, Eve, can be upper-bounded by the disturbance of the signal. In the BennettBrassard-1984 (BB84) protocol, due to its symmetry, the phase error rate is estimated by the bit error rate e ph = e bit and hence the final key rate, in Eq.
(1), is given by R = 1 − 2H(e bit ).
When e bit > 11%, the final key rate approaches to 0. Hence, the bit error rate threshold for the BB84 protocol is 11% using the above postprocessing. Note that with other postprocessing techniques 6 , a higher bit error rate threshold can be obtained. Nevertheless, there exists a fundamental limitation on the error rate threshold 7 . It is widely believed that secure QKD cannot be achieved when the background noise is too strong compare to the signal. In practice, the strength of background noise can be considered as a constant, whereas the strength of the signal exponentially decreases with an increasing transmission distance. Hence, the error rate threshold puts a fundamental limit on the secure transmission distance. From a realistic point of view, most of disturbances are caused by the environment noises and device imperfections instead of eavesdropping. Thus the leaked information is often overestimated, which is the root for the limit on the error rate threshold.
In classical communication, according to Shannon's communication theory, such error rate limit does not exist as long as e bit = 50% 1 . One might wonder whether a QKD scheme can also tolerate error rate as high as 50%. Recently, a new QKD protocol 2 called RRDPS was proposed, which is essentially evolved from the differential phase-shift (DPS) protocol 8, 9 .
Surprisingly, with the new protocol, secure key can be generated even if the bit flip error rate close to 50%.
The schematic diagram of the RRDPS QKD scheme is shown in Fig. 1 . Alice prepares a pulse train containing L pulses, encodes the (random) key information into the phase of each pulse, 0 or π, and sends it to Bob, who splits the L-pulse train into two with a beam splitter.
Bob randomly shifts (backward or forward) one of the split pulse trains by d pulses where
, and interferes them. The detection result that Bob obtains essentially reveals the phase difference between two pulses i and i ± d, where + stands for shifting forward and − stands for backward. The key rate of the RRDPS QKD protocol is given by
where R is the final key bit per L-pulse train. In experiment, the average number of valid detections per L-pulse train, Q, can be measured directly. In Method, we show how to estimate the privacy amplification term H PA .
In this letter, we demonstrate the RRPDS QKD protocol with L = 128. The setup is shown in Fig. 2 . On sender side, a continuous-wave (CW) external cavity laser (ECL) is employed as the optical source. The central wavelength of the ECL is 1550.12nm with a linewidth below 2kHz, which can provide a coherence time beyond 500µs. This CW laser is modulated by an amplitude modulator (AM, Photline 10GHz) in order to produce a 128-pulse train. The pulses, with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 300ps, are separated by 2ns. Thus the overall duration of a pulse train (also a round) is about 256ns. A phase modulator (PM, Photline 10GHz) is employed to encode a random phase shift, 0 or π, on each pulse.
On receiver side, an interferometer with variable delays is constructed in order to perform different interference measurements, as shown in Fig. 2 . The required delay time is a discrete value in {2ns, 4ns, · · · , 254ns}. Seven delay gates, denoted as DG i for i ∈ {1, · · · , 7} with a fixed delay fibre that can delay an optical pulse for a time of 2 i × 2ns, are arranged to achieve the 128-value dynamic delays. The length of delay path is carefully adjusted to ensure that pulses with and without delay can overlap well. Meanwhile, the coupling efficiency of every pair of collimators is above 90% to ensure the intensity of pulses undergoing different numbers of delay gates as closely as possible. The seven delay gates are controlled by a 7-bit random number. By making use of these delay gates, we realize any dynamic discrete delay time from the set of {0ns, 2ns, 4ns · · · , 254ns}, which includes all the required values of our experiment.
Each delay gate is constructed by a pockels cell, a fibre with fixed length and two polarizing beam splitters(PBS) as input port and output port, as shown in Fig. 2 . The pockels cell contains two RTP crystals. Each pockels cell is controlled by a customized high voltage pulse generator to achieve a fast switch between 0 V and half-wave voltage which is around 2100 V.
For each one of delay gates, if the control bit is 0, the pockels cell will not affect the arrived pulses which will lead to pass through the output PBS and no delay happened. If the control bit is 1, the pockels cell will be driven by the half-wave voltage to convert the polarization state of arrived photons from horizontal (|H ) to vertical (|V ). Thus the pulses will be reflected by the output PBS and propagate through the delay fibre. The delay gate of 2 ns (DG 1 ) is obtained by a free-space optical link of ∼ 0.6 m. The other delay gates of longer than 2 ns are obtained by the fibres with appropriate lengths. After reflected by the input PBS, the pulses pass through the half-wave voltage pockels cell again leading to convert the polarization back to |H and pass through the output PBS. These seven delay gates are distributed in both arms of the interferometer to balance the transmittance. Some PBSs are shared between two neighbour gates.
After interfered at a fibre beam splitter (FBS), the pulses are detected by two custom upconvert single photon detectors 10 In this experiment, we have realized a dynamic interferometer with 128 delays on measurement site. All of these possible interferometers require stability in the sub-wavelength order to perform high visibility interference measurements. To suppress mechanical vibration and temperature drift from the optical table and air, we employ a frame with thermal insulation and the high-damping material to envelop the interferometer. With these passive phase stabilisation methods, 128 kinds of unequal-arm interferometers can maintain a visibility of higher than 96% for a time period in the order of ten seconds, depending on the delay d. The residual phase instability is mainly due to the drift of the central wavelength of the laser. Therefore, to implement a complete RRDPS QKD experimental demonstration, an active phase-locking technique is required. On sender side, an additional path without modulation of AM and PM, which is named phase-locking light with a relatively higher intensity of about 60 million photons per second, is introduced by an FBS and an optical switch. The phase-locking light is switched on for 340 ms per second is used for phase-locking to calibrate the interferometers.
The rest 660 ms per second is used for QKD. During phase-locking, the 128 delays are traversed by turning on the specific Pockels Cells. P M 2 is deployed to adjust the relative phase between two arms of the interferometers. For each delay, the optimal compensate voltage of P M 2 is measured and recorded by a custom Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) in the control board (see Methods). The recorded compensate voltages are used to maintain the relative phase unchanged against different delay selections and central wavelength drift. With the active phase-locking technique, the visibility of most interferometers can be maintained over 96% for hours simultaneously, as shown in Fig. 3a .
In this letter, the experiment is demonstrated through a 1 km fibre link. The intensity of each pulse is 0.00625 and the total intensity of the L-pulse train is 0.8. The repetition rate of pulse trains is 10 kHz. With 34% of time used for calibration, 6600 pulse trains are transmitted per second. In the experiment, we obtain 675, 937 bits sifted keys in total. The bit flip error rates with different random delays r, e
bit , are shown in Fig.3b . Due to the unbalance of the two arms of interferometer, there are fluctuation of the bit error rates with different delays. Interestingly, the bit error rate depends on the delay r and the overall error rate is 8.9%. The total number of the rounds sent is 103679400 and finally 2.441 × 10 5 bits of security key is generated in 15709 seconds. Therefore, the key generation rate is given by 15.54 bps.
Recently, another RRDPS QKD protocol is proposed and experimentally demosntrated 11 .
Difference from the original RRDPS protocol, the random delay is chosen passively. A full scale comparison between two protocols is an interesting prospective project.
Methods
Privacy amplification estimation. Our postprocessing essentially follows the improved result 3 as well as the original one 2 . The phase error rate of the RRDPS QKDprotocol is solely determined by the source preparation. To be more specific, the leaked information Eve can obtained is upper-bound by the photon-number of the state Alice prepares in an L-pulse train 2 . In the case that the photon-number in an L-pulse train is a constant, a tighter bound of the phase error rate can be obtained by considering more details of the source 3 .
where n is the total number of photons in the L-pulse train.
In the experiment, the weak coherent source is used as the source whose photon-number follows a Poisson distribution. When considering the worst case, we assume that Bob only receives high-photon number states, whose photon number is bigger than n th , and losses always come from all the low-photon number states, whose photon number is smaller than n th . Then QH ph , the cost of privacy amplification per round, is given by
where e 
N is chosen to be 4 in this experiment. Due to the imperfection, such as nonlinear of the voltage-phase mapping and fluctuations of photon number counting, the calculated compensate voltage of PM is usually not precise enough. The compensate voltage is then searched around the calculated value for a few steps to obtain a more suitable one. Finally, a lookup table is built to store the compensate voltages for each delay. bit over 128 logical delays. The mean error rate is 8.9%. In our experimental configuration of RRDPS QKD, the key rate keeps positive for each delay.
